

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

West Coast Hotel Management,  
LLC, et al.,  
Plaintiffs,  
v.  
Berkshire Hathaway Guard  
Insurance Companies, et al.,  
Defendants.

2:20-cv-05663-VAP-DFMx

**Order GRANTING Motion to  
Dismiss (Dkt. 12).**

United States District Court  
Central District of California

Defendants Berkshire Hathaway Guard Insurance Companies and AmGUARD Insurance Company (“Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint (“Motion”). (Dkt. 12). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion. (Dkt. 25). After considering all papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

**I. BACKGROUND**

This matter arises out of the current COVID-19 pandemic and its significant impact on businesses across the country. (See Dkt. 1). Plaintiffs West Coast Hotel Management, *dba* University Square Hotel of Fresno, and West Coast Orange Group, LLC, *dba* The Hotel Fresno, each own and operate a hotel in Fresno, California. (*Id.* ¶¶ 1–2).

1 Beginning in January 2020, Plaintiffs suffered losses due to the COVID-  
2 19 pandemic. (*Id.* ¶ 21). The spread of COVID-19 internationally affected  
3 travel and resulted in fewer reservations at Plaintiffs’ hotels. (*Id.*). Then in  
4 March 2020, as the virus spread domestically, the Mayor of Fresno issued  
5 an Executive Order (“Fresno Order”) directing the closure of all non-  
6 essential businesses. (See *id.* ¶ 23). The Governor of California issued a  
7 similar state-wide Executive Order (“State Order”) the same week. (*Id.*).  
8 Plaintiffs allege that as a direct and proximate result of these two Orders  
9 (together, the “Executive Orders”), public access to Plaintiffs’ hotels was  
10 prohibited and Plaintiffs suffered severe financial losses. (*Id.* ¶ 24).

11  
12 Plaintiffs’ hotel properties are covered under a business insurance policy  
13 (the “Policy”) issued by Defendants.<sup>1</sup> (*Id.* ¶ 12). The parties do not dispute  
14 that the Policy was in effect during the time period relevant to this matter.  
15 Coverage under the policy extends only to losses that result from a  
16 “Covered Cause of Loss.” Excluded as a Covered Cause of Loss is any  
17 “loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . [a]ny virus, bacterium or  
18 other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress,  
19 illness or disease.” (*Id.* Ex. 1, at 67, 70). It further provides that “[s]uch  
20 loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that  
21 contributed concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.” (*Id.* at 67).

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<sup>1</sup> Defendants assert that Berkshire Hathaway Guard Insurance Companies is not a legal entity and that Plaintiffs are insured by AmGUARD Insurance Company. (Dkt. 12 at 1). As AmGUARD is a named defendant in this action, this distinction does not affect the determination of the Motion.

1 Under the Policy, “Business Income” coverage is available for loss of  
2 business income sustained due to the necessary suspension of operations  
3 during a “period of restoration” when the suspension is caused by “direct  
4 physical loss of or damage to property at the described premises.” (*Id.* at  
5 58). The period of restoration begins “72 hours after the time of direct  
6 physical loss or damage” and ends on the earlier of “[t]he date when the  
7 property at the described premises should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced  
8 with reasonable speed and similar quality; or . . . [t]he date when business is  
9 resumed at a new permanent location.” (*Id.* at 82). Relatedly, “Extra  
10 Expense” coverage covers expenses incurred during the period of  
11 restoration that would not have been incurred “if there had been no direct  
12 physical loss or damage to property at the described premises.” (*Id.* at 60).

13  
14 The Policy also provides “Civil Authority” coverage. When a Covered  
15 Cause of Loss causes damage to property outside the described premises,  
16 coverage will extend to any loss of Business Income or incurred Extra  
17 Expense caused by an action of civil authority that prohibits access to the  
18 described premises. (*Id.* at 60–61). Civil Authority coverage requires that  
19 access to the area immediately surrounding the damaged property is  
20 prohibited by civil authority as a result of the damage and that the action of  
21 civil authority is taken in response to the damage. (*Id.*).

22  
23 In January 2020, Plaintiffs sought indemnification from Defendants for  
24 incurred business losses. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 25). Defendants denied Plaintiffs’ claim.  
25 (*Id.* ¶ 26). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on June 25, 2020, seeking a  
26 judicial declaration that (i) the Executive Orders constitute civil authority

1 orders that prohibit access to Plaintiffs' hotels; (ii) the prohibition of access is  
2 a covered cause of loss; (iii) the prohibition of access was necessitated by  
3 physical loss of or damage to the hotels; (iv) coverage is warranted under  
4 the Policy despite the Virus Exclusion; and (v) the Policy provides Civil  
5 Authority and Business Income coverage for losses or damage due to  
6 COVID-19 and the Executive Orders. (*Id.* ¶¶ 43–45).

## 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD

9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to bring a  
10 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be  
11 granted. Rule 12(b)(6) is read along with Rule 8(a), which requires a short,  
12 plain statement upon which a pleading shows entitlement to relief. Fed. R.  
13 Civ. P. 8(a)(2); *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When  
14 evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all material  
15 allegations in the complaint—as well as any reasonable inferences to be  
16 drawn from them—as true and construe them in the light most favorable to  
17 the non-moving party. See *Doe v. United States*, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th  
18 Cir. 2005); *ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force*, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th  
19 Cir. 2005); *Moyo v. Gomez*, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994). “The court  
20 need not accept as true, however, allegations that contradict facts that may  
21 be judicially noticed by the court.” *Schwarz v. United States*, 234 F.3d 428,  
22 435 (9th Cir. 2000).

23  
24 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to  
25 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at  
26 570; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not

1 akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer  
2 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads  
3 facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it stops short of  
4 the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” *Iqbal*,  
5 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556).

6  
7 The Ninth Circuit has clarified that (1) a complaint must “contain  
8 sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the  
9 opposing party to defend itself effectively” and (2) “the factual allegations  
10 that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such  
11 that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the  
12 expense of discovery and continued litigation.” *Starr v. Baca*, 652 F. 3d  
13 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

14  
15 Although the scope of review is limited to the contents of the complaint,  
16 the Court may also consider exhibits submitted with the complaint, *Hal*  
17 *Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.*, 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th  
18 Cir. 1990), and “take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the  
19 pleadings,” *Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp.*, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988).

### 20 21 **III. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES**

22 The Court first resolves the various evidentiary issues associated with  
23 the present Motion. The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice  
24 of (i) Executive Order N-33-20, issued by Governor Gavin Newsom on  
25 March 19, 2020 (Dkt. 14-1); (ii) Proclamation of the Mayor of the City of  
26 Fresno, California, issued by Mayor Lee Brand on March 16, 2020 (Dkt. 14-

1 2); and (iii) Emergency Order 2020-02, issued by Fresno City Manager  
2 Wilma Quan on March 18, 2020 (Dkt. 14-3). (Dkt. 13). Judicial notice is  
3 appropriate as the Complaint refers to and relies on these Orders and  
4 Plaintiffs have not objected to the authenticity of the copies submitted by  
5 Defendants. See *Marder v. Lopez*, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A  
6 court may consider evidence on which the complaint “necessarily relies” if:  
7 (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the  
8 plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy  
9 attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.”). Additionally, these Orders are  
10 appropriate for judicial notice as they are “matters of public record.” *Mir*,  
11 844 F.2d at 649. The Court denies Defendants’ remaining requests for  
12 judicial notice as the Court does not rely upon the underlying documents.  
13 (Dkts. 13, 30). Additionally, the Court will consider the Policy, which is  
14 attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs’ Complaint and incorporated by reference.  
15 *Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.*, 572 F.3d 663, 665 n.1 (9th  
16 Cir. 2009) (“A court may consider documents, such as the insurance  
17 policies, that are incorporated by reference into the complaint.”)  
18

19 The Court also sustains Defendants’ evidentiary objections. (Dkt. 28).  
20 The Court will not consider the Declaration of Bac Tran (Dkt. 26), as well as  
21 the portions of Plaintiffs’ Opposition referring to the Declaration, and the  
22 “Proposal of Insurance” attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs’ Opposition. In  
23 support of their Opposition, Plaintiffs have relied improperly on unpled  
24 factual allegations and documents not attached or referred to in their  
25 Complaint nor judicially noticeable. As explained above, on a motion to  
26 dismiss, the Court will consider only the complaint, documents incorporated

1 by reference, and other matters appropriate for judicial notice. To the extent  
2 Plaintiffs' Opposition cites to or relies upon other facts outside the  
3 Complaint, the Court will disregard them.

#### 4 5 **IV. DISCUSSION**

6 Plaintiff seeks several declarations from the Court which would, in effect,  
7 establish that (1) coverage under the Business Income and Civil Authority  
8 provisions of the Policy was triggered under the circumstances alleged in  
9 the Complaint and (2) the Virus Exclusion does not preclude coverage. The  
10 Court addresses each of these three contested Policy provisions in turn.

##### 11 12 **A. Business Income Coverage**

13 Under California law, "interpretation of an insurance policy is a question  
14 of law."<sup>2</sup> *Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch.*, 21 Cal. 4th 1109, 1115, 988 (1999).  
15 "When interpreting a policy provision, we must give terms their ordinary and  
16 popular usage, unless used by the parties in a technical sense or a special  
17 meaning is given to them by usage." *Id.* (citation and quotation marks  
18 omitted). In addition, "[t]he terms in an insurance policy must be read in  
19 context and in reference to the policy as a whole, with each clause helping  
20 to interpret the other." *Sony Comput. Entm't Am. Inc. v. Am. Home*  
21 *Assurance Co.*, 532 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cal. Civ. Code §  
22 1641; *Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co.*, 5 Cal. 4th  
23 854, 867 (1993); *Palmer*, 21 Cal. 4th at 1115).

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25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>2</sup> The parties do not dispute that California law governs the interpretation of  
the Policy.

1           Accordingly, the Court examines the Business Income provisions in  
2 context to determine if Plaintiffs have stated a legally cognizable claim.  
3 Business Income coverage requires that Plaintiffs suffer “direct physical loss  
4 of or damage to property.” (Dkt. 1 Ex. 1, at 58). While “direct physical loss  
5 of or damage to property” is not defined in the Policy, it plainly requires, at  
6 minimum, that the loss or damage be physical in nature. Indeed, the Policy  
7 contemplates a “period of restoration” after such loss or damage during  
8 which property is “repaired, rebuilt, or replaced.” (*Id.* at 82). This  
9 interpretation is consistent with the interpretations given to similar or  
10 identical language by courts applying California law. See *10E, LLC v.*  
11 *Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut*, No. 2:20-CV-04418-SVW-ASx, 2020  
12 WL 5359653, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020) (holding that “[p]hysical loss or  
13 damage occurs only when property undergoes a ‘distinct, demonstrable,  
14 physical alteration’”) (quoting *MRI Healthcare Ctr. of Glendale, Inc. v. State*  
15 *Farm Gen. Ins. Co.*, 187 Cal.App.4th, 766, 799 (2010)); *Mark’s Engine Co.*  
16 *No. 28 Rest., LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut*, No. 2:20-CV-  
17 04423-AB-SKx, 2020 WL 5938689, at \*3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2020) (same);  
18 *Plan Check Downtown III, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co.*, No. CV 20-6954-GW-  
19 SKx, 2020 WL 5742712, at \*4–7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2020) (applying a  
20 physical alteration standard in determining if insured alleged “physical loss  
21 of or damage to property”); *Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Employers Fire*  
22 *Ins. Co.*, 114 Cal. App. 4th 548, 556 (2003) (holding that a direct physical  
23 loss can exist only where the property at issue has “a material existence,  
24 formed out of tangible matter, and is perceptible to the sense of touch”).  
25  
26



1 Here, Plaintiffs' Complaint establishes that they suffered a temporary  
2 loss of economically valuable use of their hotels due to a decrease in  
3 patronage or the Executive Orders. (See Dkt. 1). Plaintiffs do not claim that  
4 any property has undergone a physical alteration or needs to be "repaired,  
5 rebuilt, or replaced."<sup>3</sup> The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs are not  
6 in possession of their hotels and the property contained within them.  
7 Instead, Plaintiffs contend that the loss of *use* of their properties is sufficient  
8 to trigger coverage under the Policy. (Dkt. 25 at 5–6). Under California law,  
9 however, a "detrimental economic impact" alone—as Plaintiffs have  
10 alleged—is not compensable under a property insurance contract. *MRI*  
11 *Healthcare*, 187 Cal. App. 4th at 779; *see also Doyle v. Fireman's Fund Ins.*  
12 *Co.*, 21 Cal. App. 5th 33, 39 (2018) ("[W]hen it comes to property insurance,  
13 diminution in value is not a covered peril, it is a measure of a loss.").  
14 Hence, Plaintiffs cannot state a legally cognizable claim based on the  
15 temporary loss of use of property alleged here.<sup>4</sup> *See 10E*, 2020 WL  
16 5359653, at \*6 (dismissing claim because losses from inability to use  
17 property do not amount to "direct physical loss of or damage to property"  
18 within the ordinary and popular meaning of that phrase); *Mark's Engine Co.*,  
19 2020 WL 5938689, at \*3 (same).

20  
21 <sup>3</sup> To the extent Plaintiffs have attempted to argue that physical alteration  
22 occurred, they have failed to do so in a non-conclusory manner. The Court  
addresses this failure below.

23 <sup>4</sup> Plaintiff relies on *Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.*, No. 20-CV-03127-  
24 SRB, 2020 WL 4692385 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2020), a case from the Western  
25 District of Missouri applying Missouri law. (Dkt. 25 at 5–6). The Court  
26 chooses to follow the California authorities cited herein. Moreover, the in-  
surance policy in question in *Studio 417* did not have a virus exclusion  
which, as discussed below, precludes coverage in the present matter. 2020  
WL 4692385, at \*1.

1  
2 In their Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that there was physical damage to  
3 their property as a result of the physical nature of COVID-19. (Dkt. 25 at 5).  
4 Plaintiffs' Complaint, however, lacks the factual allegations needed to lend  
5 this theory plausibility. The Complaint merely states that there was "direct  
6 physical loss of or damage to the [hotels]." (Dkt. 1 ¶ 27). The Court  
7 disregards this conclusory allegation. See *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 ("[A] court  
8 considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying  
9 pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled  
10 to the assumption of truth."). Absent that allegation, Plaintiffs' Complaint  
11 provides only generic statements regarding the physical nature of COVID-  
12 19 and the number of cases in California and Fresno County. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 28–  
13 33). Critically, the Complaint does not attempt to connect those allegations  
14 to any losses or damage at Plaintiffs' properties. Although Plaintiffs attempt  
15 belatedly to do so in their Opposition, the Court will not consider those new  
16 factual allegations.

## 17 18 **B. Civil Authority Coverage**

19 Unlike the Business Income provisions, the Civil Authority provisions  
20 provide coverage for certain economic losses suffered by an insured in the  
21 absence of damage to the insured's property. (See Dkt. 1 Ex. 1, at 60–61).  
22 As is expected for a property insurance policy, the requirement of property  
23 damage is not eliminated. (*Id.*). Instead, coverage is premised on damage  
24 to property other than the insured's but within one mile of the insured's  
25 premises. (*Id.*). The insured's losses must result from an act of a civil  
26 authority, taken in response to that property damage, that prohibits access

1 to the area immediately surrounding the damaged property, including the  
2 insured's premises. (*Id.*)

3  
4 Here, Plaintiffs request declaratory relief establishing the existence of  
5 Civil Authority coverage under the facts alleged in the Complaint. (See Dkt.  
6 1 ¶¶ 43–45). While Plaintiffs briefly describe the Executive Orders—the  
7 acts of civil authority at issue—and contend they were issued based on  
8 “evidence of physical damage to property,” Plaintiffs nevertheless fail to  
9 provide sufficient non-conclusory allegations to state a plausible claim.  
10 (*Id.* ¶ 23). Besides the generic descriptions of the Executive Orders,  
11 Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains unsupported statements like “the properties  
12 that are damaged are in the immediate area of the [hotels].” (*Id.* ¶¶ 23–24).  
13 Plaintiffs simply have recited the coverage criteria set forth in the Policy, and  
14 such bare allegations cannot support Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief.  
15 See *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (a court need not take as true “[t]hreadbare  
16 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory  
17 statements”); *10E*, 2020 WL 539653, at \*6 (granting motion to dismiss claim  
18 for civil authority coverage where plaintiff “paraphrase[d] the language of the  
19 Policy without specifying facts that could support recovery under the  
20 Policy”).

### 21 22 **C. Virus Exclusion**

23 As with the other provisions of an insurance policy, “[t]he interpretation  
24 of an exclusionary clause is an issue of law.” *Marquez Knolls Property*  
25 *Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc.*, 153 Cal. App. 4th  
26 228, 233–234 (2007). To be enforceable, a coverage exclusion must be

1 “conspicuous, plain and clear.” *Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 32 Cal. 4th  
 2 1198, 1204 (2004); *see also Ausmus v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, No. 08–CV–  
 3 2342 L(LSP), 2009 WL 1098627, at \*4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009) *aff’d*, 414 F.  
 4 App’x 76 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting motion to dismiss because applicable  
 5 exclusion was conspicuous and clear).

6  
 7 The Policy here excludes as a Covered Cause of Loss any “loss or  
 8 damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . [a]ny virus, bacterium or other  
 9 microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress,  
 10 illness or disease.” (Dkt. 1 Ex. 1, at 67, 70). Coverage under the Business  
 11 Income and Civil Authority provisions requires that the claimed loss or  
 12 damage results from, or is caused by, a “Covered Cause of Loss.” (*Id.* at  
 13 58, 60–61). Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the Court that there is  
 14 “coverage under the Policy despite the Virus Exclusion provision.” (Dkt. 1  
 15 ¶44). Defendants assert that the Virus Exclusion provision precludes all  
 16 requested relief because it prevents coverage under the Policy.<sup>5</sup> (Dkt. 12 at  
 17 6–7).

18  
 19 The Court first analyzes the enforceability of the Virus Exclusion. A  
 20 limitation on coverage is plain and clear when it is communicated in  
 21 language understandable by the average layperson. *Nat’l Auto. & Cas. Ins.*  
 22 *Co. v. Stewart*, 223 Cal.App.3d 452, 457 (1990). Here, the Virus Exclusion

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24 <sup>5</sup> Typically, the insurer bears the burden of proving the applicability of an  
 25 exclusion. *State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Martin*, 872 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir.  
 26 1989). Defendants have met that burden. Plaintiffs, however, request de-  
 claratory relief regarding the applicability of the Virus Exclusion. Accord-  
 ingly, Plaintiffs must also allege facts that state a plausible claim for relief.

1 is plainly stated in language free of jargon. The Exclusion defines that  
2 losses are excluded whether caused directly or indirectly by a virus and  
3 specifies the viruses that are excluded, *i.e.* those that induce or can induce  
4 physical distress, illness, or disease. (See Dkt. 1 Ex. 1, at 67, 70). The  
5 Court can see no grounds for determining that this limitation is anything but  
6 plain and clear.

7  
8 The Virus Exclusion is also conspicuous within the Policy. An exclusion  
9 “must be placed and printed so that it will attract the reader's attention.”  
10 *Haynes*, 32 Cal.4th at 1204. Plaintiffs assert that the Exclusion was  
11 included “as three sentences” buried within the “100+ page policy packet.”  
12 (Dkt. 1 ¶ 37). The body of the Policy, sans endorsements, however, is 48  
13 pages long. (See *id.* Ex. 1, at 54–101). The Exclusion is identified in the  
14 Form Index that precedes the Policy, which states that the “Virus or Bacteria  
15 Exclusion” is located on page 17 of the Policy. (*Id.* at 53). The Virus  
16 Exclusion is in fact located on page 17 under a bold-font heading titled  
17 “Virus or Bacteria.” (*Id.* at 70). It is also located alongside other Policy  
18 exclusions under another bold-font heading that sensibly reads,  
19 “Exclusions.” (*Id.* at 67, 70). As the Virus Exclusion is both conspicuous  
20 and clear, it is enforceable against Plaintiffs.

21  
22 Under the facts alleged in the Complaint, the Court determines that the  
23 Virus Exclusion precludes coverage. Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains multiple  
24 admissions that their losses were caused directly or indirectly by a virus  
25 capable of inducing disease. First, Plaintiffs concede that “COVID-19 is an  
26 infectious disease caused by a virus.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 19). Plaintiffs then assert

1 that “*due to the COVID-19 outbreak*, Plaintiffs experienced a significant  
2 decline in hotel reservations and suffered significant economic losses.” (*Id.*  
3 ¶ 21 (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs also assert that they “have suffered, and  
4 continue to suffer, significant losses from the closure of their [hotels] and  
5 related losses *due to the COVID-19 pandemic*.” (*Id.* ¶ 42 (emphasis  
6 added)). Even if Plaintiffs were to argue that their losses were caused  
7 solely by the Executive Orders and not “directly or indirectly” by the virus,  
8 Plaintiffs have already admitted that the Orders were issued “to halt the  
9 physical spread of COVID-19.” (*Id.* ¶ 34). Indeed, the text of the Orders, of  
10 which the Court takes judicial notice, allows no other conclusion. (See Dkt.  
11 14-1 (State Order providing that “[o]ur goal is simple, we want to bend the  
12 curve, and disrupt the spread of the virus”); Dkt. 14-2 (Fresno Order issued  
13 in response to “conditions of extreme peril . . . with respect to the  
14 international COVID-19 pandemic”)).

15  
16 Plaintiffs do not dispute that their losses were caused by a virus.  
17 Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the Virus Exclusion is unenforceable under the  
18 reasonable expectations doctrine. (See Dkt. 25 at 1–5). Specifically,  
19 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not highlight or explain the Virus  
20 Exclusion provision before Plaintiffs purchased the Policy, causing Plaintiffs  
21 to believe they had coverage under the factual circumstances alleged in the  
22 Complaint. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 38). The doctrine, however, does not give courts a  
23 license to refuse to enforce contract terms based on one party’s  
24 expectations. “[A]n insured’s reasonable expectation of coverage is merely  
25 an interpretative tool used to resolve an ambiguity once it is found to exist  
26 and cannot be relied upon to create an ambiguity where none exists.” *Cal.*

1 *Traditions, Inc. v. Claremont Liab. Ins. Co.*, 197 Cal. App. 4th 410, 420  
2 (2011) (internal citations omitted).

3  
4 Plaintiffs argue that ambiguity exists because “[a] pandemic is a social  
5 health crisis that afflicts entire countries and continents globally; it is much  
6 more than just a simple virus.<sup>6</sup> (Dkt. 25 at 4). The Court declines to accept  
7 Plaintiffs’ interpretation. As Defendants correctly note, Plaintiffs’  
8 interpretation defies the plain and unambiguous text of the Policy and is  
9 “akin to arguing that a coverage exclusion for damage caused by fire does  
10 not apply to damage caused by a very large fire.” (Dkt. 27 at 3). As  
11 Plaintiffs are unable to circumvent the Virus Exclusion, Plaintiffs’ Complaint  
12 fails to state a legally cognizable claim for relief.

13  
14 **D. Leave to Amend**

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend  
16 “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” When considering whether  
17 to grant leave to amend pleadings, “a court must be guided by the  
18 underlying purpose of Rule 15—to facilitate decision on the merits rather  
19 than on the pleadings or technicalities.” *United States v. Webb*, 655 F.2d  
20 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, leave to amend should be denied only  
21 when allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party,  
22 cause undue delay, be futile, or if the moving party acted in bad faith.  
23 *Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g*, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).

24  
25 <sup>6</sup> Plaintiffs also raise this interpretation as an independent reason for the  
26 Court to determine that the COVID-19 pandemic is outside the scope of the  
Virus Exclusion. This does not alter the Court’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ inter-  
pretation.

United States District Court  
Central District of California


1 When dismissing a claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend even  
 2 if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the  
 3 pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”  
 4 *Eldridge v. Block*, 832 F.2d 1132, 1130 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting *Doe v. United*  
 5 *States*, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 6 Here, as the Virus Exclusion precludes coverage under the Civil Authority  
 7 and Business Income provisions of the Policy, the Court determines that  
 8 granting Plaintiffs leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the Court  
 9 GRANTS the Motion without leave to amend.

**V. CONCLUSION**

12 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without leave to  
 13 amend.

15 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

17 Dated: 10/27/20

18   
 19 Virginia A. Phillips  
 20 United States District Judge